ABSTRACT With the development of research on noncontrol data attacks and defense, the threat of data-oriented programming (DOP) attacks has attracted increasing attention from the security research community. DOP attacks can manipulate security-critical noncontrol data to alter program behavior without violating control-flow integrity (CFI) and can circumvent the most effective defenses against control-data attacks. Among DOP attacks, the misuse of user input data is a major contributor. Moreover, existing defense methods, e.g., DOPdefender, currently lack security protection for user input data. To effectively defend against DOP attacks, we propose a novel technique, DOPdefenderPlus, which draws on the idea of divide-and-conquer and uses the modular authentication technique to make DOPdefender scalable for complex software that is designed modularly, as well as introduce the Inputguard technique to protect the program input data. The DOPdefenderPlus is an enhanced version of DOPdefender, which overcomes some limitations of DOPdefender. We implement DOPdefenderPlus on a Linux operating system and use it to defend against multiple realistic DOP attacks. We also evaluate the performance of our method, and all the results show that DOPdefenderPlus can overcome the two limitations of DOPdefender while introducing a moderate runtime overhead.
I. INTRODUCTION
During recent decades, numerous runtime attacks have emerged, and they have drawn considerable attention from the computer security research community. Runtime attacks can be divided into two broad categories: control-data attacks and noncontrol data attacks. Control-data attacks introduce nonexisting edges, which are not part of the target program's control-flow graph (CFG), e.g., return-oriented programming (ROP) attacks [1] , [2] , into the execution path. Noncontrol data attacks do not modify control-flow objects and can be split into two subclasses depending on whether the control flow is changed or not. For instance, an attack that generates an unexpected number of loop iterations does not add new edges but has an observable effect on the control flow of execution. However, an attack that modifies variables used in the generation of data does not change the executed control flow at all. Following the research community gaining a deep
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understanding of control-data attacks, increasing attention has been on noncontrol data attacks [3] . Recently, DOP attacks [4] , [5] have emerged, and noncontrol data attacks have proven to be Turing-complete.
Pioneering research has been conducted and shows that DOP can circumvent the most effective defenses against control-data attacks, i.e., data execution prevention (DEP) [5] , address space layout randomization (ASLR) [6] , [7] and CFI [8] , [9] . Therefore, the research community is trying to determine how to defend against DOP attacks. Dataflow integrity (DFI) [10] , [11] maintains the definition-use relationship from the data-flow graph (DFG) and determines whether the definition of each data object is legal at run-time. In theory, DFI can defend against DOP attacks. However, DFI introduces performance overhead of up to 103% [10] , making the deployment of this approach impractical. Data structure layout randomization (DSLR) [12] , [13] is proposed to randomly reorder the fields or add dummy fields in encapsulated data objects. DSLR can prevent noncontrol data attacks from correctly locating and manipulating tar-get. However, its randomization is fixed at runtime and vulnerable to brute force attacks. Further, existing DSLR methods require manual efforts to determine which data structures can be randomized. Wang et al. [14] presented the data-aware finite-state automaton (dFSA) model and propose the defense method DOPdefender based on dFSA. The dFSA model augments the security-critical noncontrol data over the basic finite-state automaton (FSA), which can help monitor the target program and achieve an awareness of security-critical noncontrol data at runtime. Therefore, DOPdefender can validate the legality of the operation on the security-critical noncontrol data and protect runtime data from out-of-scope operations. While DOPdefender offers security advantages, it still has two major limitations. L-1: When the size of the software grows to a certain degree, the corresponding FSA model at the basic block level may suffer from a state explosion. For large-scale programs, such as Chromium, DOPdefender has difficulty completely automating the creation of the entire dFSA model and fails to protect large-scale programs without any guiding information. L-2: Since DOPdefender attempts to extract security-critical noncontrol data from the target program via static analysis, it may fail to identify the security-critical noncontrol data dynamically produced at runtime. However, the research community has concluded that the user input data is a kind of security-critical noncontrol data, and the misuse of program inputs is a typical method to exploit memory corruption vulnerability [3] ; e.g., DOP attacks may achieve the dataflow stitching technique by misusing the program inputs. In cases in which the input data is misused, DOPdefender is essentially noneffective.
To address the two limitations of DOPdefender, we propose a novel technique, DOPdefenderPlus, which uses a modular authentication technique to make DOPdefender scalable for complex software that is designed modularly and introduces the Inputguard technique to protect the dynamically generated security-critical noncontrol data, i.e., user input strings, from being misused. On the basis of DOPdefender, DOPdefenderPlus uses the divide-and-conquer [15] strategy to protect large-scale software without programmer's assistance, avoiding the problem of state explosions. Further, we present a novel protection technique for misuse of input data, which can not only mitigate noncontrol data attacks but also prevent some control-data attacks. Therefore, DOPdefenderPlus has better scalability and effectiveness compared with DOPdefender.
In summary, the paper makes the following contributions. 1) Modular authentication. Complex software that uses a modular design can be decomposed into many small interacting modules, and in each module, we can apply the DOPdefender approach to guarantee the module's security at runtime. Simultaneously, we add identification for communication information to enable efficient and secure interaction of modules in complex software. Benefiting from the divide-and-conquer method, the modular authentication technique can avoid state explosion, making it more practical for complex software.
2) Inputguard. We propose a technique called Inputguard to protect input strings from being misused. Inputguard can overcome the shortcomings of DOPdefender in failing to protect the dynamically generated security-critical noncontrol data, which can guarantee that our method remains effective against DOP attacks that manipulate input data.
3) We design DOPdefenderPlus, a novel practical defense method for complex software. We evaluate the effectiveness and performance of DOPdefenderPlus and the experiment results show that DOPdefenderPlus is more scalable and effective than DOPdefender.
II. THREAT MODEL
In our threat model, we assume that the adversary gains the following abilities.
There is at least one unknown memory corruption vulnerability (such as a buffer or heap overflow) in the target program, which enables adversaries to tamper with the data of the target program.
The target program is under the protection of W X [16] , which is enabled at the operating system level. Hence, program code modification is not allowed at runtime, and we exclude control-flow attacks that bypass W X protection. The system is protected from direct memory access (DMA) [17] . Hence, adversaries cannot bypass the virtual memory permissions.
We assume that the compilation process of the target program is absolutely trustworthy. Adversaries cannot tamper with the content of the target program during the compilation of the target program.
We assume that the kernel is absolutely trustworthy and the memory in the kernel space cannot be corrupted.
The second subclass of the noncontrol data attacks that leave the execution path completely unchanged is outside the scope of the threat model. Existing DOP attacks are usually target-specific to achieve restricted program functionality that should not be available in a given execution context. Therefore, off-the-shelf DOP attacks fall into the first subclass of noncontrol data attacks. Fortunately, DOPdefenderPlus can defend against these types of attacks. Our threat model is similar to previous work on defenses against data-oriented attacks.
III. DESIGN OF DOPdefenderPlus
A. ARCHITECTURE Figure 1 shows the abstract view of DOPdefenderPlus. Guided by the modular decomposition strategy, the target program can be decomposed into 4 parts: module 1, module 2, module 3 and module 4 (here we assume the target program is composed by 4 modules). The actuator intercepts communication between the modules and activates the protection for each module. As shown in Figure 1 , the target program starts from module 1, and the data flow goes into module 3, and then into module 4. When the actuator intercepts the communication information from module 1 to module 3, it conducts a modular authentication to ensure the security of the communication information and activates the DOPdefender + Inputguard protection for the corresponding module 3. In Figure 1 , the activation is symbolized by the open switches between DOPdefender + Inputguard protection for the corresponding module and the actuator module. The actuator module traces the interaction between modules and activates the DOPdefender + Inputguard protection for the corresponding modules (shown by the opening/closing of the circuit in Figure 1 ). The DOPdefender technique is a defense method against noncontrol data attacks based on the dFSA model, which augments the FSA by the securitycritical noncontrol data expected to be used on the outgoing edge of the state transition. According to the dFSA model, DOPdefender can be made aware of the security-critical noncontrol data that are expected to operate at runtime and validate the legality of the operation. However, the securitycritical noncontrol data set of the target program constructed by DOPdefender ignores the user input string, which is also a type of security-critical noncontrol data summarized by Chen et al. [3] . To compensate for this limitation, the Inputguard technique is a protection method for input data of the target program. Inputguard can collaborate with DOPdefender by identifying the misuse of the input string in the target program based on the legality rules of the input data. Benefiting from the decomposition, complex software can be converted into relatively simple modules, and the construction of the corresponding dFSA model without programmer's assistance would not suffer from a state explosion problem. Therefore, each module can be protected by DOPdefender and the Inputguard technique, making our method more scalable. Note that the interaction between modules should be authenticated to ensure the integrity of the target program at runtime. As the DOPdefender technique is elaborated in our previous work, the following introduces the modular authentication technique, the Inputguard technique and how to put it all together for the objective function.
B. MODULAR AUTHENTICATION
The modular authentication technique is inspired by the divide-and-conquer strategy. The divide-and-conquer strategy can be abstractly described in three steps. First, if a problem is too difficult to be solved, we can divide the problem into many subproblems that are smaller instances of the same problem. Then, we can conquer the subproblems by solving them recursively. If the sub-problem sizes are small enough, however, the subproblem can be solved in a straightforward manner. Finally, the solution for the original problem can be achieved by combining the solutions to the subproblems. In this paper, we are interested in the following problem. When the size of the target software increases to a certain degree, how can the corresponding dFSA model be constructed in case of possible state explosion? However, if the target software is decomposed into many smaller modules, modular authentication can be enabled, and the problem becomes much easier. That is, we can divide the problem of the construction of the dFSA model corresponding to the complex target software into many subproblems that correspond to the smaller modules generated by decomposing the target software. Thus, the problem of state explosion is subtly avoided. Fortunately, many complex software programs already have a modular design, and modular software design is becoming a well-investigated topic in software engineering. However, the cost of modular transformation depends highly on applications, and it is difficult to formulate the process of modular transformation in general statements. Therefore, DOPdefenderPlus targets complex software that is designed modularly.
Note that in the third step of the divide-and-conquer strategies there is a new problem that is different from the original problem, i.e., the solutions of all subproblems should be merged into the solutions of the original problem. In the case of this paper, each module of the target program can be protected through the corresponding DOPdefender + Inputguard, and the security of the interaction between these modules should also be guaranteed. Otherwise, the tar- get program might suffer from malicious exploitation at the module level. Therefore, we intercept the communication between modules and verify the communication information. The interaction between modules is authenticated secure, and only the communication information passes the verification. As shown in Figure 2 , if module i attempts to send a message data ij to module j, the DOPdefender for module i would authenticate data ij before the message (dataij) is allowed to be sent to module j, i.e., authenticate (data ij ) in the DOPdefender modulei . In particular, the data ij is the parameter of the communication function, and it is identified as security-critical noncontrol data in DOPdefender. Therefore, the data-flow integrity of the data ij can be ensured by the DOPdefender modulei , which is responsible for protecting module i. Then, data ij is extracted from the message (data ij ), and module j receives only data ij if the data have been authenticated through modular authentication. Similarly, modules achieve information interaction and collaboration in modules through module authentication. When adversaries attempt to manipulate the information data ij exchanged between modules and launch a noncontrol data attack in the target program, the modular authentication can identify the inconsistency of data ij caused by illegal manipulation during the generation or transmission of data ij . Hence, the integrity of the data flow for the security-critical noncontrol data in and between modules can be protected.
C. INPUTGUARD
Inputguard is a technique that prevents program inputs from being manipulated. To facilitate the analysis of the input data structure, we define a logical subfield based on the syntax format of the input data. The syntax format reflects the logical semantic structure of the input data, and the input data may consist of several logical subfields. For example, if the input data contains a space character and a comma character, the input data can be divided into three logical fields: the part before the space, the part between the space and the comma, and the part after the comma. When the target program receives the input data, it parses the input data into various parts. Then, the program allocates different memory areas and, thus, data structures to store these parts. These parts decomposed by the target program are not necessarily equal to logical subfields, and this is highly dependent on the target program. Therefore, we define the operational unit field to depict how a program operates on the input data.
An operational unit field in the input data represents the smallest atomic unit for operation by the target program at runtime. Note that the logical field may be different from the operational unit field. The logical field relies on the syntax format, while the operational unit field is determined by the target program. For an operational unit field f , the set of data structures used by the program to store the operational unit field is called the constraint domain for the operational unit field, denotedas d(f ). However, this is a narrow definition of the constraint domain; the broad definition, denotedas D(f ),should also include the dependent data structures that may influence the value of the corresponding d(f ). As shown in Figure 3 , there is a unique constraint domain that corresponds with each operational unit field, e.g., D(f 1 ) is the constraint domain for the operational unit field f 1 . The constraint domain for the input data is the union of every constraint domain for each operational unit field in the input data and is denoted as
In Figure 3 , the misuse of the input data can be represented as two types of violations. The first violation is when an operational unit field is used for an unmatched constraint domain in D(f ), e.g., the value of the data structures in D(f 2 ) is overwritten by the operational unit field f 1 . The first type of violation is caused by the operational unit field that is undefined in benign executions but manipulated in the exploitation, e.g., f x . f x might be a part of another operational unit field f 1 in the benign execution. Another violation is when an operational unit field is used for an unmatched constraint domain beyond D(f ), e.g., the value of the data structures in D(f y ) is overwritten by the operational unit field fm. To exemplify the two types of violations, we present the analysis in conjunction with Figure 4 , which is referenced from [2] . If the protection is enforced at the operational unit field granularity, Inputguard should construct the constraint domain for each operational unit field through static analysis and verify program behaviors related to operational unit fields according to the constraint domain at runtime, thus ensuring the security of the input data. However, the constraint domains for the corresponding operational unit fields are determined by the program semantics, and the construction of each constraint domain requires a deep understanding of program semantics. It is difficult to verify whether the operational unit field f is operated on within the constraint domain D(f ) because the length of the logical subfields are usually variable, and sometimes a direct comparison for the operational unit field is not easy. Moreover, Inputguard introduces a significant performance overhead at runtime. However, if the protection is enforced at the input data granularity, Inputguard can construct the constraint domain for the input data, i.e., D(f ), and verify whether the input data operates within D(f ). Further, for the first type of violation, Inputguard should identify the size of some spatial scalable data structures in D(f ) by the static analysis and check the size of some objects before the input data operation. In Figure 4 , for example, Inputguard should identify that the size of the data structure temp [200] is 200, and it is the constraint domain for the second operational unit field. Therefore, the size of the second logical input data field should be less than 200. Since Inputguard aims to detect violations and stop suspicious attacks promptly and does not need to diagnose the exact location of the violations, it is a trade-off between security and performance to enforce Inputguard protection at the input data granularity.
D. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
According to the DOPdefenderPlus system architecture, the DOPdefender, the modular authentication technique and the Inputguard should be organically combined to collaborate on the protection task for the target program. To enforce the DOPdefender + Inputguard protection, program input data ui should be added to the security-critical noncontrol data set. By using the security-critical noncontrol data identification and location technique in DOPdefender, we can extract ui in the target program and obtain information about the input data structure for Inputguard protection, i.e., constraint domain d(ui) and D(ui) as well as the sizes l(ui) of some spatial scalable data structures in D(ui). Therefore, we can define a quad <ui, d(ui), D(ui), l(ui)> to model the program input behavior on the input data ui. First, the program input behavior is located in the target program through sensitive function analysis. Then, the quad <ui, d(ui), D(ui), l(ui)> is constructed based on the algorithm for the program input behavior model shown in Figure 5 , and it is added to the corresponding edge in the dFSA model. Finally, DOPdefender + Inputguard protection is enforced to protect the target program at runtime. Based on the dFSA model, To enforce collaboration between the modular authentication and the DOPdefender + Inputguard protection, the communication information data ij from the module i to module j is added to the security-critical noncontrol dataset. Therefore, we include the function parameters fp, system call parameters sysp, decision variable dv, program input data ui, the communication information data ij and the dependent variables of (fp, sysp, dv, ui, data ij ) dp as security-critical noncontrol data. Note that there may be ui and data ij which are also identified as the other kinds of security-critical noncontrol data, such as the fp and sysp. To avoid the above overlapping situation, we eliminate the security-critical noncontrol data identified as the ui and data ij from the other kinds of security-critical noncontrol data. In module i, the generation of data ij is secured by the corresponding DOPdefender protection, and the value of data ij is recorded. Further, before message(data ij ) is received by module j DOPdefenderPlus conducts a verification to ensure the integrity of information data ij If the modular authentication fails, the DOPdefenderPlus confirms that the target program is experiencing noncontrol data attacks and immediately terminate the target program. Therefore, the integrity of communication information data ij during generation and propagation is guaranteed.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
According to the DOPdefenderPlus architecture described in Figure 1 , the implementation of DOPdefenderPlus mainly consists of three modules: the actuator, the DOPdefender and the Inputguard. The actuator module is designed to accomplish two driving tasks. The first task realizes the communication information authentication between modules according to the data-flow dependence among modules in the program to drive the collaboration between modules and ensure the security of the target program at the modular level. The second task activates the corresponding DOPdefender + Inputguard protection for the module according to the control-flow dependence in the modules of the target program to drive the runtime protection for the security-critical noncontrol data in each module. The DOPdefender is designed to protect the security-critical noncontrol data, such as (fp, sysp, dv, dp), from being manipulated at runtime. As we have introduced the design and implementation of DOPdefender in our previous work, we will not address it again here. Inputguard aims to protect the program inputs to prevent adversaries from manipulating the input data to achieve DOP attacks. In the following, we elaborate on the implementation of the actuator and the DOPdefender + Inputguard.
A. ACTUATOR
To achieve the two tasks for the actuator module, the target software should first be decomposed into many smaller interacting yet isolated modules. The isolation for modules means that the dFSA model corresponding to the module actually represents the behavior of that module. Therefore, we use static analysis based on data and control-flow dependencies to identify the modules in the target software. However, the decomposition process is highly application dependent and might not be expressed in general terms. Fortunately, considering that our method targets complex software with a modular design, it is not challenging to decompose the target software into modules. Because isolated modules of the target software cannot directly communicate with each other, e.g., through memory access, the communication function is usually achieved with standard protocols and has a well-defined interface. For example, as shown in Figure 6 -(1), in the Linux operating system, software modules can use the socket functions to communicate with each other. Therefore, by the sensitive functions analysis, we can locate the communication behavior in the low-level virtual machine (LLVM) intermediate representation (IR) of module i of the target program and identify the information data ij to be transmitted. Further, the data should be added to the security-critical noncontrol dataset and protected by the corresponding DOPdefender for module i. We insert the instrumentation code at the entrance to module j that is expected to receive the message(data ij ) and authenticate the integrity of the communication information data ij by comparing the value of data ij in the memory and data ij recorded in the security-critical noncontrol table (the table is introduced in the DOPdefender approach). Meanwhile, when the communication information data ij passes the authentication at the entrance of module j, the corresponding DOPdefender + Inputguard protection for module j is activated. Note that the instrumentation is also conducted on the LLVM IR file of the target module. Thus, the actuator can activate the DOPdefenderPlus + Inputguard protection corresponding to the module and ensure the security of communication information between modules, thus accomplishing two driving tasks.
B. DOPDEFENDER + INPUTGUARD
The DOPdefender + Inputguard module is implemented on the basis of the DOPdefender. Since we elaborated on DOPdefender in our previous work, here, we will not cover how to implement the DOPdefender. First, we should identify and locate where program input behaviors are. In Linux, the program input behavior is essentially achieved with the input family system calls, which is illustrated in Figure 6 -(2). Therefore, we can locate the program input behavior in the LLVM IR of module i of the target program through a sensitive functions analysis. Further, the program input data ui in the program input behavior can be extracted from the corresponding input family function. Given the input data ui, our compiler finds its constraint domain d(ui) and D(ui) by performing a traversal along the data dependence edges with the program dependence graph (PDG) of module i in the target program. For some spatial scalable data structures in D(ui), our compiler records its size in the l(ui) based on the initialization definition statements. Consequently, the model <ui, d(ui), D(ui), l(ui)> for the program input behavior is constructed. According to the results of the above static analysis, we write pass in LLVM to conduct instrumentation on the LLVM IR file of the target module. In particular, we insert the instrumentation code before and after the input system call and after the input data operations. Figure 7 describes the process of runtime monitoring and validation through the DOPdefender + Inputguard module. First, the handler module, defined in DOPdefender and extended in the DOPdefender + Inputguard module, identifies the location where the exception is triggered (x). If the exception is triggered for the program input behavior, i.e., an input system call is expected to execute, or input data is expected to run, the exception will be discarded with the Inputguard technique. Otherwise, the exception is discarded with the DOPdefender technique, which we do not discuss here. If the location is before an input system call in the basic block b i , then the corresponding state transition si→sj in the dFSA can be found, and the handler module is aware of the program input behavior in this transition. Then, the handler module records the execution context in memory (y), and this information is sent to the result analysis module (defined in DOPdefender and extended in the DOPdefender + Inputguard module) in the system (z). Next, the result analysis module records the execution context and the logical fields for the input data in the security-critical noncontrol data table ({). If the size of a logical field is larger than l(ui) of the model <ui, d(ui), D(ui), l(ui)>, the result analysis module confirms that the target program may experience DOP attacks and stops the target process immediately. Otherwise, the result analysis module notifies the target program to continue running (}allow). Subsequently, the target module is expected to trigger the second exception when it runs at the location after an input system call is executed, e.g., line 4 of the basic block i in Figure 7 . The result analysis module is aware of the situation and verifies whether there is a violation in the input behavior based on the model <ui, d(ui), D(ui), l(ui)>, i.e., z{|. The result analysis module compares the execution context recorded in the table with the execution context in the memory and stops the target program when it detects a violation; specifically, there is an unexpected change in the value of the data structure around d(ui) yet outside D(ui). Similarly, if the location is after the input data operation, e.g., line i+1 of basic block i in Figure 7 , the result analysis module conducts a validation for the input data based on the model <ui, d(ui), D(ui), l(ui)>, i.e., y z{|. Note that in line i+1 of basic block i in Figure 7 , the result analysis module also validates the legality of the operation on the input data ui with the DOPdefender method. The dashed line in Figure 7 indicates the target module transitions between the user space and the kernel space.
V. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
To evaluate DOPdefenderPlus's defense capability against DOP attacks, we conduct three real-world case studies on software in Linux and an effectiveness comparison test. We built the verification platform of DOPdefenderPlus in the following experimental environment: LLVM is 3.5.0, and the operating system is Ubuntu 14.04 with the 3.2.0−x86_32 kernel. Our experiments aim to answer the following questions: 1) Can DOPdefenderPlus protect complex software and address the first limitation of DOPdefender?
2) Can DOPdefenderPlus defend against DOP attacks that manipulate user input data and address the second limitation of DOPdefender?
A. CASE STUDIES IN CHROMIUM
Chrome is certainly a complex software program, with more than 5 million lines of code, but its structure is so rigorous that we can first grasp the whole Chrome project as a whole, and then gradually understand each specific module. As shown in Figure 8 [31] , the Chromium browser architecture is com-VOLUME 7, 2019 posed of two types of processes, including the target process and the broker process. The target process represents the sandbox instance, and actually, there may be many target processes, which all interact with and depend on the main broker process. Therefore, Chromium can be decomposed into several modules based on its architectural structure. In particular, the number of the modules decomposed through our method is larger than that in the Figure 8 . However, the modules decomposed through our method is consistent with architectural structure in the Figure 8 from an abstract and functional perspective. Then, DOPdefenderPlus can be applied in Chromium to prevent DOP attacks.
1) ARBITRARY CROSS-ORIGIN READS ATTACKS ON CHROMIUM
In Chromium, the file path is considered a part of the origins, and local files should not be allowed to access the contents of other files by the SOP (same-origin policy) protection [18] , which is not enforced for the FILE scheme. Assuming that there is a memory corruption vulnerability in the renderer process, adversaries can reveal any local files to the server controlled by adversaries [19] . To bypass the SOP check in the security monitor deployed in the renderer, adversaries need to set the m_universalAccess flag. However, DOPdefenderPlus can identify the security-critical noncontrol data m_universalAccess and conduct a validation for the operation on this flag, thus preventing adversaries from manipulating the flag.
The X-Frame-Options [20] can prevent one site from being iframed in a cross-origin site. To load the content of a cross-origin site into the renderer, adversaries attempt to set the isSameSchemeHostPort flag to bypass the SOP check and gain the power to achieve that goal [19] . However, setting the isSameSchemeHostPort flag is considered an illegal operation on the security-critical noncontrol data by DOPdefenderPlus and the malicious behavior can be detected.
The cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) mechanism allows one origin's resources to be requested from another origin. That is, the CORS can block XMLHttpRequests to retrieve the data from cross-origin sites via the two functions SecurityOrigin::canRequest and SecurityOrigin::canAccess. To fetch the resources from arbitrary sites via an XMLHttpRequest, adversaries attempt to set m_protocol, m_host, and m_port the same as the targeted site in the SecurityOrigin object [19] . However, this malicious behavior is prohibited by DOPdefenderPlus and the attack cannot be implemented.
Chromium does not allow scripts to obtain the data from the tainted canvas via the getImageData interface. If adversaries attempt to read data in the canvas remotely, the SecurityOrigin:: taintCanvas is invoked to check the access to the tainted canvas [19] . By setting the m_universalAccess flag, the adversaries can bypass the access check conducted by the two functions canAccess and canRequest, which are called by SecurityOrigin:: taintCanvas. As discussed in the case of the FILE scheme, the m_universalAccess flag is protected by DOPdefenderPlus and adversaries cannot read data in the canvas remotely.
2) ARBITRARY cROSS-ORIGIN READS/WRITES ATTACKS ON CHROMIUM
In Chromium, one site is not allowed to access the content of another cross-origin site in a frame/iframe via the JavaScript APIs (application program interface) such as contentDocument/contentWindow (this interface is used to access the document object model (DOM) elements of an origin within an iframe), window.frames DOM API (this interface is used to read/write the content of frames in the frameset) and window.parent/top API (this interface is used to access the content of the parent window). To achieve the power for arbitrary cross-origin reads/write in b.com, adversaries attempt to set https for m_protocol, b.com for m_host and 0 for m_port. Then, adversaries manipulate the DOM elements and mimic actions on behalf of the user in any sites within iframes/frames. However, under the protection of DOPdefenderPlus, the DFI of the security-critical noncontrol data m_protocol, m_host and m_port is guaranteed, and the attacks discussed above will fail.
3) CROSS-ORIGIN PERSISTENT STORAGE ATTACKS ON CHROMIUM
The storage APIs such as cookies, localstorage and indexedDB are used for websites to store persistent data and maintain the states for web sessions. Analogously, these storage APIs also follow SOP and they prevent adversaries from getting/setting cookies, localstorage and indexedDB of cross-origin sites. In Chromium, the target process may contain different origin sites in iframes, and the security monitor for the check of these storage sites is deployed in the renderer. To yield/set cookies of arbitrary origins, adversaries attempt to set m_cookieURL as the targeted site's URL in the document object used in the functions such as WebCookieJar::cookies and WebCookieJar::setCookie. Similarly, adversaries access data in localstorage and indexedDB of the targeted site by setting m_protocol, m_host, and m_port, which are used in the functions WebStorageNamespaceImpl::createStorageArea. However, if our method DOPdefenderPlus is deployed in Chromium, these data, e.g., m_cookieURL, m_protocol, m_host, and m_port, are identified as the security-critical noncontrol data and protected at runtime. Therefore, the legality of the operation on these data can be ensured, and the adversaries' goals are not achieved.
B. CASE STUDIES OF GHTTPD
The ghttpd program is a lightweight web server that supports CGI, which is the standard for running executable files on the server for data processing. The cgi-bin administration restricts users from executing programs outside of the cgi-bin directory and is therefore critical to the security of the HTTP server. There is a stack overflow vulnerability in the version 1.4.0-1.4.3 of the ghttpd application [21] . If adversaries manipulate the user input URL as AAA. . . A\x29\xd7\xff\xbf\x20\x20/cgibin/../../../../bin/sh, the input string is divided into two logical fields based on the syntax format (\x20 represents a blank space), i.e., AAA. . . A\x29\xd7\xff\xbf and /cgibin/../../../../bin/sh. As shown in Figure 9 , in the malicious input string of the operational unit field 0xbfffd729, which is not defined in the benign execution, overwrites the 4-byte memory region of the esi as 0xbfffd729. Then, the value of ptr is assigned a value of 0xbfffd729 through the command pop esi. However, after the input string operation, DOPdefenderPlus compares the execution context recorded in the table with the execution context in the memory and detects a violation of an unexpected change in the value of the data structure ptr, which is beyond the constraint domain of the user input string. Therefore, DOPdefenderPlus stops the target program immediately and prevents the DOP attack.
C. CASE STUDIES OF GZIP
The gzip program is a utility program designed for file compression and decompression in Linux. According to the function of gzip, the file can be decomposed into the compression module and the decompression module. However, gzip has a buffer overflow vulnerability in version 1.2.4 [22] . The function strcpy (ifname, iname) in gzip does not properly handle long file names. Upon execution of the gzip program with a file name of 2000 bytes, a buffer overflow occurs, and adversaries can launch a noncontrol data attack to achieve a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. However, for a benign program input in gzip, the input data filename is considered a whole logical field, and its operation is consistent with the model <ifname, d(ifname), D(ifname), l(ifname)>. In the attack scenario, the length of the program input ifname is longer than the upper limit of the defined length, i.e., MAX_PATH_LEN=1024. Therefore, another data structure that is out of the constraint domain D(ifname) is overwritten by the program input. DOPdefenderPlus detects this violation at runtime and terminates the target program.
D. THE EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISON TEST
To verify the advantages of DOPdefenderPlus over DOPdefender in effectiveness, we evaluate DOPdefenderPlus to determine whether it can truly defend against a set of CVEs. The Nginx HTTP server program for version 1.3.9-1.4.0 has a buffer overflow memory error vulnerability [32] . Adversaries can corrupt the web root directory string through single-edge stitching and elevate the privilege. The wu-ftpd program in the previous version of 2.6.0 has a format string vulnerability [33] , and adversaries may exploit the vulnerability to tamper with pw->pw_uid before it is expected to be called by setuid() and elevate the privilege of the user process. Adversaries can exploit the vulnerability in the proftpd [34] to corrupt the decision variable src in the loop body as the gadget dispatcher and implement MINDOP virtual operations. Null httpd is a web server in Linux [35] . Adversaries can exploit a heap buffer overflow vulnerability VOLUME 7, 2019 to corrupt its directory and execute arbitrary commands. SSHD has an integer overflow vulnerability in version 1.2.27 [36] , and adversaries can exploit this vulnerability to modify the security-critical non-control data authenticated and invade the system to bypass the authority authentication. As shown in Table 1 , DOPdefenderPlus can effectively defend against the 6 non-control data attacks. In particular, DOPdefender failed to defend against the attacks on Chromium without any guiding information. However, DOPdefenderPlus overcame this limitation and successfully protected Chromium from the attacks.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We present an investigation of the performance overhead incurred by the DOPdefenderPlus method. We test DOPdefenderPlus on a SPEC CPU2006 and several realistic applications, thereby evaluating its area overhead and runtime overhead. Each test was performed 50 times, and the average value was taken as the test result.
A. AREA OVERHEAD
To measure the area overhead of DOPdefenderPlus, we generated the protected executable files of the 18 test programs using our method and compared the area overhead of DOPdefenderPlus with that of DOPdefender. The size of each executable file compiled without instrumentation is compared with the size of the protected executable file to evaluate the influence on area overhead.
As shown in Table 2 , the size of the protected executable file increased by 18.1% in DOPdefenderPlus. Moreover, there was no direct correlation between the area overhead caused by instrumentation and the size of the target program itself. Compared with DOPdefender, DOPdefenderPlus had a 3.7% increase in area overhead. As DOPdefenderPlus introduced the Inputguard technique as well as the modular authentication technique, there should be more places to insert the instrumentation code in the target program. However, compared with the 50% area overhead introduced by DFI [10] , DOPdefenderPlus still had a significant advantage. Note that Chromium and the 403.gcc were not used as the test programs for the performance evaluation in DOPdefender. Since the two programs belong to large-scale and complex software, unfortunately, the method DOPdefender might fail to apply to these complex programs (as discussed in the first limitation of DOPdefender). 
B. RUNTIME OVERHEAD
For comparison with DOPdefender, we used the same runtime overhead method. We ran the 17 programs without instrumentation and with instrumentation. The 13 benchmark programs in SPEC CPU2006 are CPU-intensive programs, whereas the 4 web server programs are I/O-intensive programs. In particular, to measure the execution delay introduced by DOPdefenderPlus, we wrote test programs to access the 4 web server programs and perform an operation on the programs. The time of a successful execution of each test program in the corresponding instrumentation program and the normal program are used to evaluate the runtime overhead of DOPdefender. For example, the corresponding test program is written for the wu-ftpd program, and it first creates a socket connection with wu-ftpd and logs into the server and then sends the command mkd /home/admin/test to the server. Finally, the server program wuftpd executes the command and the test is logged out of the wu-ftpd server. By measuring the execution time of the test in the wu-ftpd server with instrumentation and without instrumentation, we found that the runtime delay averages 17.9% in the wu-ftpd. As illustrated in Table 3 , DOPdefenderPlus introduced a 18.3% runtime overhead on average for I/O-intensive programs, which had a 4.8% increase in runtime overhead compared to DOPdefender. It is obvious that there is a positive relationship between the runtime overhead and the instrumentation code.
As illustrated in Figure 10 , DOPdefenderPlus introduced a 32.9% runtime overhead on average for CPU-intensive programs, which had a 4.5% increase in runtime overhead compared to DOPdefender. Obviously, the increases in runtime overhead are caused by DOPdefender + Inputguard and modular authentication protection, which is introduced by DOPdefenderPlus. However, DOPdefenderPlus overcomes the two limitations of DOPdefender and has higher security. In particular, the runtime overhead in the 4 web server programs was less than that of the 13 benchmark programs in SPEC CPU2006, which confirms that the instrumentation has a greater impact on CPU-intensive programs than on I/O-intensive programs.
As Chromium is a comprehensive and complex program, we measured the runtime performance of Chromium separately. Navigation timing [23] was a javascript API for precise performance measurement in web browsers. This API provides a simple method for obtaining precise and detailed time states for page navigation and load events. Therefore, we selected a fixed site to load in Chromium 100 times and focused on five events during the page load, i.e., dnstime, tcptime, firstpainttime, rendertime and loadtime. These five events represented the domain name system (DNS) resolution time, the transmission control protocol (TCP) connection establishing time, the first screen time, the render time and page on-load time, respectively. In particular, the runtime overhead of the firstpainttime and theloadtime were computed by the formula responseStartnavigationStart and loadEventEnd-navigationStart, respectively. As shown in Figure 11 , the runtime overheads of these five events were averaged from the 100 test results, and DOPdefenderPlus introduced 33.7% runtime overhead on average for Chromium. In addition, through a comprehensive analysis of the time delay ratio introduced by the four events in the page loading process, e.g., the event rendertime generated a 36.5% time delay, we found that the event rendertime was the main reason for introducing additional overhead. In Chromium, the security monitor for the SOP checks was mainly enforced in the renderer; thus, there might be more instrumentation code executed in the FIGURE 11. The runtime overhead test on chromium. VOLUME 7, 2019 rendertime event and hence introduce a significant time delay.
VII. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Since our method enhances DOPdefender, it still suffers from the same limitation, i.e., DOPdefenderPlus also fails to defend against noncontrol data attacks that exploit the dynamic link library of the target program. In the future, we will attempt to propose a method for analyzing the dynamic link library and make up for this limitation. To make our method more scalable, we apply the divide-and-conquer strategy to divide the problem of constructing the dFSA model corresponding to the complex target software into many subproblems corresponding to the smaller modules. However, our method applies to only those software programs that are designed modularly. Further, when complex software is decomposed into several modules, there might be a module that is still too large for constructing the corresponding dFSA model. Moreover, the module cannot be decomposed into several smaller modules that are isolated. In this situation, our method may fail to protect the target software. Although many complex software programs already have a modular design, and modular software design is becoming increasingly popular, future research efforts are needed to protect complex software programs that are not designed modularly. Our method cannot defend against the DOP attacks that fall into the second subclass of noncontrol data attacks, which do not change the executed control. Fortunately, existing DOP attacks definitely influence the executed control flow to achieve greater power and fall into the first subclass of noncontrol data attacks. Therefore, DOPdefenderPlus can still mitigate existing DOP attacks. However, to ensure security, DOPdefenderPlus introduces a nonnegligible runtime overhead. In the future, we will perform an in-depth study to improve the security and performance of our method, as well as balance security and performance.
VIII. RELATED WORK
With the emergence of DOP attacks, the threat of noncontrol data attacks has once again attracted extensive attention and in-depth research from the security community. In this section, we focus on two potential defenses against DOP attacks: data-plane randomization and DFI.
Data-plane randomization aims at changing the data-plane resources of the attack surface to realize the transfer of the attack surface to confuse adversaries and raise the bar for launching DOP attacks. According to the granularity of the randomized objects, we divide the data-plane randomization into four categories: data space randomization based on data encryption [24] , DSLR [12] , [13] , stack layout transformation (SLX) [25] and page table layout randomization [26] . The data space randomization based on data encryption was proposed by Bhatkar et al [24] , and it is implemented by encrypting variables stored in the program memory. However, encrypting all data variables creates considerable performance overhead, making it impractical for deployment.
DSLR is presented to prevent data structure manipulation attacks (DSMA), which is a category of data-oriented attacks. Lin et al. [13] proposed a software polymorphism technique that randomizes program data structure layout via modifying the definition of a data structure to reorder the fields. However, this static DSLR is determined at compilation time and might suffer from information leaks at runtime. To address the limitation of the static DSLR, Chen et al. [12] proposed an adaptive DSLR called SALADS, which allows a program to adaptively randomize the layout of each security-sensitive data structure independently. However, SALADS randomizes only a fixed subset of data structures, which makes SALADS possible to bypass. SLX [25] is a technique for the runtime transformation of function stack layouts to protect against stack-based attacks. Unfortunately, SLX cannot prevent the noncontrol data attacks that manipulate the noncontrol data in the program heap. To ensure the integrity of the kernel page tables, Davi et al. [26] proposed a page table layout randomization technique called PT-Rand. PT-Rand randomizes the location of page tables to provide Linux kernel CFI protection (RAP) [27] against data-only attacks on kernel page tables. However, PT-Rand cannot defend against all kinds of dataonly attacks.
DFI is designed to ensure the data-flow integrity of the program at runtime. The idea of DFI was first introduced by Castro et al. [10] and mitigates data corruption before the manipulation takes effect. Whenever a value is read from memory, DFI ensures that a variable can be written by only a legitimate write instruction. The legitimate write instruction means that it can be derived by reaching definitions analysis. Reaching definitions analysis is determined at compile time. For each value read instruction, the compiler statically computes the set of write instructions that may write the value. However, intraprocedural DFI incurs 44%, and interprocedural DFI incurs 103% runtime performance overhead [10] . To address the problem, HDFI [11] was presented to perform DFI-style checks by extending the ISA. Reliance on a particular hardware structure makes HDFI impractical for widespread deployment. As the study progressed, the researchers proposed several variations of DFI. Critical Variable Integrity (CVI) [28] verifies define-use consistency of critical variables. Orpheus [29] enforces cyber-physical execution semantics with the program behavior model eFSA. However, CVI and Orpheus both are new security mechanisms for embedded control programs in defending against DOP attacks. Zhang et al. [30] proposed the concept of data influence domain to describe the variation characteristics of variables in memory, and then proposed a protection method IDM based on influence domain monitoring. IDM monitors the influence domains of the security-critical noncontrol data in the hypervisor and relies on the hardware virtualization platforms. DOPdefender [14] is a novel approach to thwarting DOP attacks based on the dFSA model. DOPdefender can be made aware of the security-critical noncontrol data that are expected to be operated at runtime and validate the legality of the operation on the security-critical noncontrol data. However, DOPdefender is not scalable for complex software and fails to protect the security-critical noncontrol data dynamically produced at runtime.
Data-plane randomization is vulnerable to information leakage attacks and cannot effectively protect the dynamically generated user input data. DFI methods generally need to construct DFG through static analysis, and there is no specific protocol to protect user input data. The protection for the program inputs is considerably important for raising the bar for launching noncontrol data attacks, and mitigating some control-data attacks that exploit program inputs. DOPdefenderPlus is a protection method for complex software that can defend against DOP attacks that manipulate program inputs.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a novel technique DOPdefenderPlus, a defense method against DOP attacks. We are inspired by the divide-and-conquer idea and present the modular authentication technique to make DOPdefender scalable for complex software that is designed modularly and introduce the Inputguard technique to protect the program input data. DOPdefenderPlus is actually an enhanced version of DOPdefender, which makes up for the two limitations of DOPdefender. We implement DOPdefenderPlus on a Linux operating system and use it to defend against multiple realistic DOP attacks. Further, we also evaluate the performance of our method and all the results show that DOPdefenderPlus can make up for the two limitations of DOPdefender while introducing a moderate runtime overhead.
